Abstract. Under the special institutional background of China's capital market, political connection is an important form of interaction between government and enterprises. Based on the data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share stock markets from 2010 to 2016, this paper analyzes the influence of executive payment on earnings management, and analyzes the regulatory mechanism in which political connection plays a role. The study has found that executive payment is significantly and positively correlated with accrued earnings management; political connection negatively regulates the relationship between executive payment, accrued earnings and real earnings management.
Introduction
For the study of earnings management, one of the focuses that scholars generally pay attention to is whether managers conduct earnings management for the purpose of salary maximization. Watts (1986) [1] and other scholars hold that the contract motivation of executives is one of the basic motivations of earnings management activities, compensation formulation affected by accounting indicators will induce enterprise executives to increase reported earnings through accounting manipulation power (Li et al., 2007 ) [2] . To some extent, political connections can play a role in place of the market and laws and affect the operation of companies in China. For example, it is easier for enterprises to reduce market entry barriers, obtain property rights protection and government subsidies and solve financing difficulties through political connections (Faccio, 2010; Wu et al., 2012) [3] [4] . As an informal mechanism, political association can provide a path for the development of compensation contract research.
Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
Watts and Zimmerman(1978) [5] , in their early research, summarized three motivations for enterprises to implement earnings management activities, among which the incentive of dividend incentive plan is one of the important motivations for management to manipulate earnings. There are two main types of earnings management methods. One is the accrual earnings management by using the choice of accounting policies or methods; the other is the real earnings management by means of constructing real transactions. Assuming that the implementation of real and accrued earnings management can both meet the expected goal of maximizing executive compensation, but the overall weighted value of cost and risk of carrying out accrued earnings management is significantly lower than that of carrying out real activity earnings management, rational executives tend to prefer the accrued earnings management with low risk and low cost. Therefore, the following basic assumptions are proposed:
H1: Under other preconditions, executive compensation can induce executives' accrued earnings management behavior, and inhibit the real earnings management behavior of executives.
Okhmatovskiy (2010) [6] believes that the government with power may obscure some market economy systems in order to seek additional income through "rent setting". For politically connected enterprises, the corporate governance mechanism is relatively less perfect, which makes it difficult to effectively restrict and supervise the behaviors of senior executives and weakens the monitoring of on-the-job consumption. As a social capital, the political identity of executives can often enhance the bargaining power of executives' compensation, which will weaken the incentive of executives to manipulate compensation through earnings management. Combined with the above analysis, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H2: under other preconditions, the political connection of executives can reverse adjust the relationship between executive compensation and accrual system and real earnings management.
Data and Methods

Data
In this paper, Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share stock markets from 2010 to 2016 are taken as the research object, and samples of listed companies in financial insurance, ST companies and some samples lacking major data are excluded. In order to avoid the influence of extreme value, the continuous variable is reduced by 1%.The data in this article comes from the CSMAR database.
Variables and Indicators
Earnings Management. (1) Accrued earnings management. The extended modified Jones model was used for measurement, in which discretionary accruals (DA) were used as the alternative variable of accrual earnings management. (2) Real earnings management. According to the Roy Chowhury model, a comprehensive real earnings management agent variable RM was constructed.
Executive Compensation. executive compensation is measured by the natural logarithm of the average of the "total compensation of the top 3 executives" of listed companies.
Political Connection. If the actual controller, CEO and chairman of the company are party representatives, NPC deputies, CPPCC members or have served in the central or local governments and other departments at various levels, they are deemed to have political connections. 
Results
Descriptive Statistics
As can be seen from Table 2 average value of manipulative accrual profit is 0.1404, and the standard deviation is 0.1461, indicating that most listed companies have obvious accrual earnings management behavior. The standard deviation of real earnings management is 0.2126, which is larger than that of accrual earnings management, indicating that the accrual earnings management behavior of listed companies is more common. The standard deviation of political association is large and the average value is small, indicating the scarcity of this resource. 
Correlation Analysis
It can be seen from Table 3 , the correlation between the main variables basically passed the significance test, and there was no multicollinearity among the variables. 1 Note: *, ** and *** are respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table 4 shows the regression results of model (1) . Executive compensation and discretionary accrual (DA) are significant at the level of 5%.The executive compensation level is significantly correlated with the real earnings management at the 1% level and the coefficient is -0.045, indicating that the executive compensation is negatively correlated with the real earnings management. H1 is valid. Although real earnings management compared with accrual earnings management more concealment, because enterprise real surplus management activities distort the real results, is likely to impact corporate cash flow, to a certain extent, which will make the profits of previous adjustment part during the subsequent management hard to turn it back, so that real earnings management may have a negative effect on corporate value. Therefore, executives are more inclined to adopt low-cost and low-risk accrual management behaviors to achieve the desired goal of high salary. As can be seen from Table 5 , political correlation and accrued earnings management degree of enterprises are significantly positively correlated. LNPAY*PC is significant at 1% level, indicating that political correlation will negatively adjust the relationship between executive compensation and accrued earnings management. Because of the existence of political connection, it can reduce the behavior of executives to implement accrual earnings management for the motivation of their own compensation planning. Political correlation and real earnings management are significant at 1% level, indicating a significant positive correlation between political correlation and real earnings management degree of enterprises. LNPAY*PC is significant at 1% level, indicating that political correlation will negatively adjust the relationship between executive compensation and real earnings management. H2 is valid. In addition, the coefficient between LNPAY*PC and accrued earnings management is -0.076, which is greater than the coefficient between LNPAY*PC and real earnings management (-0.115), indicating that political correlation has a stronger inhibitory effect on the relationship between executive compensation and real earnings management. 
Regression Analysis
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The results of this paper show that: (1) executive compensation can induce executives to perform accrued earnings management, but higher executive compensation within a certain range can inhibit executives' motives for real earnings management activities; (2) negative political connections Adjustment affects the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management;
